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ENEMY OF THE STATE


 30,000 terrorists! Homeland security idiots can't stop putting Americans on no-fly lists!
 

(Story lead from Sploid.com)



http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1009_22-5984673.html

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Tens of thousands mistakenly matched to terrorist watch lists

By Anne Broache, CNET News.com

Published on ZDNet News: December 6, 2005, 3:41 PM PT

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WASHINGTON--About 30,000 airline passengers have discovered since last November that their names were mistakenly matched with those appearing on federal watch lists, a transportation security official said Tuesday.

Jim Kennedy, director of the Transportation Security Administration's redress office, revealed the errors at a quarterly meeting convened here by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee.

Kennedy said that travelers have had to ask the TSA to clear their identities from watch lists by submitting a "Passenger Identity Verification Form" and three notarized copies of identification documents. On average, he said, it takes officials 45 to 60 days to evaluate the request and make any necessary changes.

Travelers have been instructed to file the forms only after experiencing "repeated" travel delays, he said, because additional screening can occur for multiple reasons, including fitting a certain profile, flying on a one-way ticket or being selected randomly by a computer.

Of the 30,000 people who said they were mistakenly matched to names on the list, none ever had been kept from boarding an airplane, Kennedy said. Their names appeared only on a "selectee list," where members are singled out for additional screening. Names on the "no-fly" list, however, are unilaterally barred from flying. The office said it hasn't been informed of any cases where people have disputed matches with names on the no-fly list.

After submitting their notarized forms and identifications, and waiting for evaluations, the vast majority of the people mistakenly matched to names on the watch list have now been added to a "clearance" list. That doesn't mean their names are erased from the watch list. In fact, travelers who go through the paperwork are told, Kennedy said, that "it will not quote 'remove' you from the list because the person we're still looking for is out there."

Instead, their names are put on the separate clearance list, which means they typically can't check in for flights at an unmanned kiosk and must approach the ticket counter to explain their situation and have an airline employee match their name to the clearance list.

A total of about 60 applicants had to be denied, as security officials couldn't determine that the applicants weren't actually the same as those named on the list, Kennedy said.

According to government statistics, about 1.8 million people travel on 30,000 separate commercial flights through the nation's airports every day. It is unclear how many names are on the TSA's selectee and no-fly watch lists.

Skepticism continues to swirl around a proposed passenger screening program known as Secure Flight, which government auditors and watchdog groups have criticized for failing to lay out clear goals or address privacy and data security concerns. New York-based lawyer Lisa Sotto, the acting committee chairman, called it "the most interesting topic to this group and the one that we're most concerned about."

Kennedy's remarks came after the advisory committee unanimously adopted a list of five broad recommendations for the Secure Flight program, which include: making the program more transparent to the public and airlines, which receive the daily watch lists; keeping the goals of the program narrowly focused; collecting minimal data; providing proactive, efficient ways for people to dispute wrongful delays or prohibitions from boarding flights; and regular audits by the Homeland Security Privacy Office.

Part of the reason government officials are clamoring for Secure Flight is that it is "designed to minimize the number of instances where people are misidentified as potential terrorist threats," Kennedy said, though he didn't elaborate on the reasons for that claim.

The recommendations to Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff are nonbinding. Chertoff was scheduled to speak to the committee on Tuesday but canceled at the last minute.

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CNET News.com's Declan McCullagh contributed to this report.

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ALSO SEE:

http://lnk.nu/washingtonpost.com/6tb.html

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Mixed Messages From Hill on Patriot Act Talks

By Dan Eggen and Charles Babington
Washington Post Staff Writers
Thursday, December 8, 2005; A11

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The White House is pressing House members to compromise on a key issue in negotiations over the reauthorization of the USA Patriot Act, moving Congress closer to a deal, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) said yesterday.

But talks were still going on last night amid continued opposition to some provisions by Senate Democrats. A spokesman for House Judiciary Committee Chairman F. James Sensenbrenner Jr. (R-Wis.) stressed that no final agreement had been reached.

The mixed messages underscored the often tense negotiations surrounding renewal of the anti-terrorism law, which was approved after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. Sixteen provisions are due to expire on Dec. 31, and the Senate and the House have been arguing for months over legislation that would renew the law while placing new restrictions on governmental powers.

Lawmakers had appeared close to a deal before Thanksgiving, but the tentative agreement fell apart amid objections from a bipartisan group of senators to provisions that they contended would curtail civil liberties.

In a meeting with Washington Post reporters and editors yesterday, Specter said House members had agreed to allow the expiration, after four years, of provisions that give FBI agents access to library and business records and that permit roving wiretaps. The move would mark a significant concession by the House, which had won a seven-year sunset in an earlier compromise.

Specter said the latest deal "is as good as it's going to get." Later, he added: "The administration was very insistent and the House was very insistent that the Senate cannot have its way on all the points."

Specter also said that the latest proposal has the support of Sensenbrenner, who has spearheaded Patriot legislation in the House. But Sensenbrenner spokesman Jeff Lungren said there is "no conference report at this point."

"If we had a conference report, we would have filed it," Lungren said. "Until everything is agreed upon, nothing is agreed upon."

Specter described waiting in a long reception line at a White House Christmas party on Monday to talk to President Bush about the need for compromise. On Tuesday, Vice President Cheney called Sensenbrenner and urged him to accept the four-year sunset to allow the legislation to move forward, according to congressional aides who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the negotiations.

Cheney spokeswoman LeaAnne McBride declined to comment on that, but she said "the Patriot Act is a priority and the vice president has been engaged since its inception."

Specter and Senate aides said that Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.) remains concerned about the provisions governing "national security letters," which the FBI uses to demand customer records from businesses such as telephone companies and Internet service providers. Recipients of such letters are required to keep the requests secret.

The legislation would allow judicial review of the letters, but critics say that other language would effectively force judges to approve them as long as the government was not acting in bad faith.

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© 2005 The Washington Post Company

Posted by ENEMY OF THE STATE at 5:35 AM - No Comments   Add a Comment  
 
 Voting Machines Under Scrutiny: States Face a Jan. 1 Deadline to Meet Reliability Standards
 



http://lnk.nu/washingtonpost.com/6ta.html

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Voting Machines Under Scrutiny

States Face a Jan. 1 Deadline to Meet Reliability Standards

By Brian Bergstein
Associated Press
Wednesday, December 7, 2005; A23

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The potential perils of electronic voting systems are bedeviling state officials as a Jan. 1 deadline approaches for complying with standards for the machines' reliability.

Across the country, officials are trying multiple methods to ensure that touch-screen voting machines can record and count votes without falling prey to software bugs, hackers, malicious insiders or other ills.

These are not theoretical problems -- in some states they have led to lost or miscounted votes.

One of the biggest concerns -- the frequent inability of computerized ballots to produce a written receipt of a vote -- has been addressed or is being tackled in most states.

An October report from the Government Accountability Office predicted that steps to improve the reliability of electronic voting "are unlikely to have a significant effect" in the 2006 off-year elections, partly because certification procedures remain a work in progress.

"There's not a lot of precedents in dealing with these electronic systems, so people are slowly figuring out the best way to do this," said Thad E. Hall, a political scientist at the University of Utah and co-author of "Point, Click, and Vote: The Future of Internet Voting."

In North Carolina, more stringent requirements -- which include placing the machines' software code in escrow for examination in case of a problem -- have led one supplier, Diebold Inc., to say it will withdraw from the state, where about 20 counties use Diebold voting machines.

A different type of showdown is brewing in California, where Secretary of State Bruce McPherson says he might force makers of the machines to prove their systems can withstand attacks from a hacker. One such test on a Diebold system -- Diebold machines were blamed for voting disruptions in a 2004 California primary -- is planned.

The state has been negotiating details with Harri Hursti, a security expert from Finland who uncovered severe flaws in a Diebold system used in Leon County, Fla. (He demonstrated how vote results could be changed, then made screens flash "Are we having fun yet?")

Similarly, elections officials in Franklin County, Ohio -- where older voting machines gave President Bush 3,893 extra votes in a preliminary count in 2004 -- recently asked computer experts to test newly purchased touch-screen voting machines from Election Systems and Software Inc.

Such designated hack attempts might be a flawed approach, because a failure proves only that a particular hacker could not break into a machine under certain conditions. That is not the same as opening things up to a broader group of researchers, as software developers sometimes do. Many critics of touch-screen election computers argue that the software should be publicly examined to make sure vote tampering could not occur.

A McPherson spokeswoman said the hacking test would be one of many factors in deciding whether to approve the voting machines. McPherson has released a 10-point plan for certification efforts, including a software code escrow system.

The scrutiny is likely to make California miss a Jan. 1 deadline set under the federal Help America Vote Act of 2002.

That law was aimed at phasing out the punch-card ballots and other old-fashioned systems that proved problematic in 2000. It requires states to improve disability access at polling places in addition to standardizing electronic voting systems.

A report by Election Data Services Inc., a political consulting firm, for the U.S. Election Assistance Commission determined that 23 percent of American voters used electronic ballots in 2004, a 12 percent increase over 2000.

Since then, largely because of warnings from computer security experts and grass-roots activism, many states have began requiring the machines to produce paper receipts that voters can examine. At least 25 states have such rules and 14 more have requirements pending, according to the Verified Voting Foundation.

"There's a long way to go -- making our elections truly trustworthy in this country is a multifaceted problem," said David L. Dill, a Stanford University computer scientist and founder of the foundation. But he added that he expected a "much better situation in 2006" and noted that improving electronic voting has become "a delightfully nonpartisan issue."

Manufacturers insist that their voting machines are reliable and that critics have made too much of isolated problems.

"Anytime there's an issue that happens with a particular voting system, all vendors are painted with the same broad brush," said Michelle Shafer, a spokeswoman for Sequoia Voting Systems Inc. "There are differences from product to product. You need to look at the track record of particular companies."

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© 2005 The Washington Post Company

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"Those who cast the votes decide nothing. Those who count the votes decide everything." - Attributed to Josef Stalin
Posted by ENEMY OF THE STATE at 5:18 AM - No Comments   Add a Comment  
 
 According to Indictment, AIPAC Has Been Under Investigation Since Early 1999
 

"...This AIPAC is like a parallel government in Washington - except that it fights any American effort that Israel wants fought. It is a parallel government whose spiritual heart is in Tel Aviv, not in Washington, DC..."

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http://lnk.nu/wrmea.com/6t9.html

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Washington Report, November 2005, page 19

Special Report

According to Indictment, AIPAC Has Been Under Investigation Since Early 1999

By Andrew I. Killgore

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Who launched the current FBI investigation of AIPAC (the American Israel Public Affairs Committee), Israel’s principal lobby in the United States? The original version had it that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was told about the investigation soon after President George W. Bush began his first term of office. That was in early 2001.

According to a story by Laura Rozen in The Nation of July 14, 2005, President Bush, after long refusing to meet with PLO chief Yasser Arafat, had decided to meet Arafat at the September 2001 opening session of the United Nations General Assembly “if progress were made in high level talks between Palestinians and the Israelis.” Citing a Sept. 9, 2001 article by Jane Perlez in The New York Times, Rozen said that, after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks, the Bush/Arafat meeting never took place. Rice, reportedly concerned over the leak of sensitive administration intelligence in the Perlez article, then demanded an FBI investigation. This meant that the investigation began in early September 2001.

But from the Aug. 4 indictment of former AIPAC foreign policy director Steve Rosen and former AIPAC Iran specialist Keith Weissman, it now appears that Rosen has been under FBI surveillance since early 1999. Specifically, the indictment says, Rosen talked on April 13, 1999 with “Foreign Official 1,” an Israeli, disclosing “codeword protected intelligence.”

The indictment of Rosen and Weissman triggered a statement by “Mideast analyst” Kenneth Pollack that he is one of the two (U.S.) government officials referred to in the Rosen and Weissman indictment as “USGO-1”; the other official, “USGO-2”, was identified by “sources” as David Satterfield, a former deputy assistant secretary of state. Pollack—husband of CNN reporter Andrea Koppel and son-in-law of ABC’s Ted Koppel—formerly worked as a staffer on President Bill Clinton’s National Security Council. The Pollack-Satterfield story is carried in the Aug. 31 edition of Israel’s Jerusalem Post. Pollack denies giving AIPAC any classified information.

Presumably the Israel lobby’s political clout would preclude an FBI investigation of the AIPAC colossus unless it had the president’s approval. If the wording of Rosen’s indictment is correct, it means that the investigation was ongoing during the presidency of Bill Clinton, who was all but surrounded by Zionists. The fact that the investigation is continuing means that President Bush is aware of it and, so far, approving it.

After the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks, the Bush/Arafat meeting never took place.

Rosen is a very, very big fish in the Israel/AIPAC Fifth Column that subverts U.S. Middle East policy. He expanded AIPAC’s focus from the Congress to the State Department, the Pentagon, the White House—and to the Republican Party. According to The Washington Post of May 19, 2005, “For more than two decades Rosen has been the mainstay of AIPAC and the architect of the group’s ever-increasing clout. Though Rosen is listed below Executive Director Howard Kohr on AIPAC’s organizational chart, people familiar with AIPAC’s history say that Kohr is a protégé of Rosen’s and got that job with his help. Kohr declined to be interviewed about Rosen. ‘He [Rosen] is a quiet guy,’ said M.J. Rosenberg, director of policy analysis for the Israel Policy Forum, another pro-Israel group, and a former AIPAC employee. ‘But everyone knows he’s the brains behind the outfit.’”

In the above-mentioned Nation article, Rozen spoke of a “chill” in the media world from the jailing of The New York Times’ Judith Miller, and the FBI investigation of AIPAC. “The danger,” Rozen wrote, “is that this would enable the Bush administration to shape policies with even less consultation from the public and Congress.” David Ignatius took up the same “chill” line in his Aug. 24 Washington Post op-ed.

The chill effect is based on a benevolent view of AIPAC as contributing to an open debate of American foreign policy formulation. Others view AIPAC as the “800-pound gorilla” that squeezes U.S. policy into a painfully narrow Zionist-centric focus of “Israel right-or-wrong,” and “America take the hindmost.”

This 800-pound AIPAC controls some three dozen misleadingly-named pro-Israel political action committees that can and do give $100,000 to a “good” electoral candidate or withhold any money at all from a “bad” candidate. Names such as Delaware Valley PAC, Florida Congressional Committee, Georgia Peach and St. Louisians for Better Government contain no hint of Israel-Firstism, but are all part of the Israel lobby. The definition of “good” or “bad” is based entirely on whether the candidate votes, or will vote, on issues important to Israel, as defined by AIPAC. The mildest criticism of Israel earns a “bad” record, and automatic opposition by AIPAC.

The 800-pound AIPAC generously offers to provide a senator or congressman with a “free” intern for his or her office who, of course, reports back to AIPAC any slippage in support for Israel. Any reluctance to accept an intern arouses suspicion that the elected official is a secret “anti-Semite.” 

AIPAC’s Placement Service

This AIPAC works diligently to place neocons at the Pentagon, the White House (especially on the National Security Council staff) and State Department, and provides “experts” to testify on critical television programs. One such example is the placing of neocon Douglas Feith as under secretary of defense at the Pentagon. Feith created a private intelligence service, the office of Special Plans (OSP), which fed outlandish bits of intelligence to the White House. The OSP “proved” that Iraq had non-existent weapons of mass destruction. Feith finally has resigned his position.

Another example was the placing of the noisome neocon John Bolton as under secretary of state. Bolton is now U.S. ambassador to the United Nations under an interim recess appointment.

The 800-pound AIPAC includes the Israel lobby’s hometown newspaper, The Washington Post, whose journalists never write a critical word about Israel, and which recently tried to bury a story about the FBI investigation of Pentagon Iran analyst Larry Franklin by publishing it in the “Metro” section.

This AIPAC is like a parallel government in Washington—except that it fights any American effort that Israel wants fought. It is a parallel government whose spiritual heart is in Tel Aviv, not in Washington, DC. The trials of Franklin and former AIPAC honchos Rosen and Weissman, if they occur as scheduled in January 2006, may reveal the true subversive face of AIPAC—and, finally, make it possible for the U.S. to adopt Middle East policies that promote its own interests.

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Andrew I. Killgore is publisher of the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs.

Posted by ENEMY OF THE STATE at 5:13 AM - No Comments   Add a Comment  
 
 Nuke Over U.S. Could Unleash Electromagnetic Tsunami
 

WARNING: CONSIDER THE SOURCE
and the possible motives for releasing
such a scenario. Could it be a 'set-up'
for an upcoming 'wag-the-dog'? With
no communications many would buy
what Big Brother sold them... - EOTS

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http://lnk.nu/worldtribune.com/6t8.html

(Supporting Links at Source URL)

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Nuke over U.S. could unleash electromagnetic tsunami

SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM

Wednesday, December 7, 2005

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The following excerpt from the new book, "War Footing: 10 Steps America Must Take to Prevail in the War for the Free World", by Frank J. Gaffney and Colleagues, is reprinted with permission from the publisher, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland.

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If Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda — or the dictators of North Korea or Iran — had the ability to destroy America as a superpower, would they be tempted to try?

Wouldn't that temptation be even greater if that result could be achieved with a single attack, involving just one nuclear weapon, perhaps even one of modest power and relatively unsophisticated design?

And, what if the attacker could be reasonably sure that the United States would not know who was responsible for such a devastating blow?

Unfortunately, that scenario is not far fetched. It is the conclusion of a report issued in 2004 by a blue ribbon commission created by Congress. The commission found that a single nuclear weapon, delivered by a ballistic missile to an altitude of a few hundred miles over the United States, would be "capable of causing catastrophe for the nation."

How is that possible? By precipitating a lethal electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack.

In 2000, concerned about EMP technology, Congress created the "Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack" (the EMP Threat Commission, for short). In its final report, presented in summer 2004, the panel warned that terrorists could indeed execute such an attack by launching a small nuclear armed missile from a freighter off the coast of the United States.

The ingredients for an EMP attack may be already within reach.

Al-Qaeda is known to have a fleet of freighters.

One of those freighters could easily be outfitted with a short- range ballistic missile capable of getting a nuclear weapon to almost any point in the airspace above our country.

Thousands of Scud missiles exist around the world, and they are said to cost less than $100,000 to purchase from willing suppliers like North Korea. (In December 2002, a North Korean ship was intercepted, temporarily, as it prepared to deliver twelve Scud missiles to Yemen.)

North Korea has also declared its willingness to sell nuclear weapons to terrorists.

Iran has demonstrated it has the capability to launch a Scud missile from a vessel at sea.

Ship-launched ballistic missiles have a special advantage. The "return address" of the attacker may be difficult to determine, especially if the missile is a generic Scud type weapon, found in many countries' arsenals.

But even though all the tools needed for this nightmare scenario could be in the hands of terrorists already, and even though a high altitude EMP attack could be considered the ultimate "weapon of mass destruction," little has changed in our level of preparedness or even our policy debates. EMP is still rarely mentioned in discussions of the WMDs we need to worry about.

We need to start worrying.

An Atmospheric Tsunami

A nuclear weapon produces several different effects. The best known are the intense heat and hyperpressures associated with the fireball and the accompanying blast.

But a nuclear explosion also generates massive outputs of other kinds of energy. These include the creation of intense streams of x-rays and gamma-rays. If those are unleashed outside the earth's atmosphere, some of them will interact with the air molecules of the upper atmosphere.

The result is an enormous pulsed current of high energy electrons that will interact, in turn, with the earth's magnetic field.

In an instant, an invisible radio frequency wave is produced — a wave of almost unimaginably immense intensity, approximately a million times as strong as the most powerful radio signals on the earth. The energy of this pulse would reach everything in line of sight of the detonation. And it would do so at the speed of light.

The higher the altitude of the weapon's detonation, the larger the affected area would be. At a height of three hundred miles, for example, the entire continental United States would be exposed, along with parts of Canada and Mexico.

As the fireball expands in space, it would also generate electrical currents on earth — ultra high-speed electromagnetic "shock waves" that would endanger much of our technological infrastructure. Such high speed currents would disable, temporarily or permanently,

extended electrical conductors, such as the electricity transmission lines that make up our power grid.

any unprotected computers and microchips.

all the systems that depend on electricity and electronics, from medical instruments to military communications.

As the EMP Threat Commission put it: The electromagnetic fields produced by weapons designed and deployed with the intent to produce EMP have a high likelihood of damaging electrical power systems, electronics, and information systems upon which American society depends. Their effects on dependent systems and infrastructures could be sufficient to qualify as catastrophic to the nation. [Emphasis added.]

The systems at risk from EMP include:

electronic control, sensor, and protective systems of all kinds

computers and cell phones

cars, boats, airplanes, and trains

the infrastructures for handling electric power, telecommunications, transportation, fuel and energy, banking and finance, emergency services, and even food and water.

A One Two Three Punch

Following rapidly on this electromagnetic tsunami, there would be a "medium speed component" of EMP. It would cover roughly the same geographic area as the first, "high- speed" component, though its peak power level would be much less.

This medium-speed component follows the high speed component by merely a fraction of a second. It further damages the electric systems that are already impaired and exposed by the initial electromagnetic impact.

And finally, there is a third wave of EMP attack, the "slow component" produced by the continuing expansion of the fireball in the earth's magnetic field. This slow component — a pulse that may last just seconds or minutes — creates disruptive currents in electricity transmission lines, damaging the surviving electrical supply and distribution systems.

Unpredicted Test Effects

The destructive power of EMP effects was first glimpsed in the atmospheric nuclear tests of the Cold War era. The United States and the Soviet Union independently discovered the same phenomenon: a high-altitude nuclear explosion could damage or destroy electronic systems on the earth, with potentially devastating consequences for the targeted society.

In 1962, the United States conducted a test called "Starfish," detonating a nuclear weapon about 250 miles above Johnston Island in the Pacific Ocean. The resulting EMP reached all the way to the Hawaiian Islands, a little over 700 miles away. There, on the far edge of the EMP field, the explosion extinguished streetlights in Honolulu, tripped circuit breakers, triggered burglar alarms, and damaged a telecommunications relay facility.

The Soviet tests included a series of high altitude nuclear detonations over South Central Asia. EMP from these tests damaged overhead (and even underground) electrical cables at a range of 375 miles, causing surge arrestor burnout, blown fuses, and blackouts.

The consequences of an EMP attack would of course be far more significant today, with so much of our infrastructure (civilian as well as military) dependent on electricity and electronics. The EMP Threat Commission estimated that it could take "months to years" to fully restore critical infrastructures after an EMP attack:

Depending on the specific characteristics of the attacks, unprecedented cascading failures of our major infrastructures could result. In that event, a regional or national recovery would be long and difficult and would seriously degrade the safety and overall viability of our nation. The primary avenues for catastrophic damage to the nation are through our electric power infrastructure and thence into our telecommunications, energy, and other infrastructures. These, in turn, can seriously impact other important aspects of our nation's life, including the financial system; means of getting food, water, and medical care to the citizenry; trade; and production of goods and services.

The recovery of any one of the key national infrastructures is dependent on the recovery of others. The longer the outage, the more problematic and uncertain the recovery will be. It is possible for the functional outages to become mutually reinforcing until at some point the degradation of infrastructure could have irreversible effects on the country's ability to support its population. [Emphasis added.]

What Is Being Done to Address the Danger?

An EMP attack potentially represents a high tech means for terrorists to kill millions of Americans the old fashioned way, through starvation and disease. Although the direct physical effects of EMP are harmless to people, a well designed and well-executed EMP attack could kill — indirectly — far more Americans than a nuclear weapon detonated in our most populous city.

Dr. Lowell Wood of Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, a member of the EMP Threat Commission, has warned in testimony before Congress that an EMP attack could reduce the United States to a pre-Industrial Age capacity, in terms of its ability to provide vital food and water to its population.

In 1900, prior to widespread electrification of the United States, our country's population was less than one-third of its size today. An attack that destroyed our technological infrastructure would certainly decimate the population.

But if EMP is such a big threat, why have we not heard more about it? Why do we not hear discussions of how to reduce its potential impact on this country? In fact, the EMP Threat Commission was the outcome of four years of hearings and briefings, as a frustrated Congress tried to alert the executive branch to the danger of EMP attack.

Their efforts seemed futile. In 1997, Gen. Robert Marsh (then-chairman of the Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection) told the House Armed Services Committee:

[W]e consider a terrorist acquiring a nuclear weapon, and positioning it at the high altitude necessary for generation of an EMP burst that would debilitate our infrastructures, to be a very remote possibility. . . . Such an event is so unlikely and difficult to achieve that I do not believe it warrants serious concern at this time. [Emphasis added.]

In contrast, the testimony Congress received from other sources strongly suggested that such a devastating attack was neither unlikely nor difficult to achieve. It seemed that there was, in fact, reason to be concerned that terrorists and rogue states might present an EMP threat to the United States.

Concerned members of congress received help from an unlikely quarter in May 1999, when Russia explicitly invoked the specter of an EMP attack on the United States.

Vladimir Lukin (the chairman of the Duma International Affairs Committee) assured a delegation of American legislators that Russia was not helpless in the face of U.S. led interventions:

Hypothetically, if Russia really wanted to hurt the United States in retaliation for NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia, Russia could fire a submarine launched ballistic missile and detonate a single nuclear warhead at high altitude over the United States. The resulting electromagnetic pulse would massively disrupt U.S. communications and computer systems, shutting down everything.

This blunt statement succeeded in getting the attention of both parties in Congress. A second opinion was clearly needed. And on October 30, 2000, the EMP Threat Commission was established by law.

The EMP Threat Today

The EMP Threat Commission conducted a worldwide survey of foreign scientific and military literature to assess the knowledge and intentions of foreign states regarding an EMP attack. The survey confirmed that both the physics and the military potential of EMP are indeed widely understood in the international community.

The commission survey found that the following nations were knowledgeable about EMP: China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Saddam Hussein's Iraq, North Korea, Pakistan, and Russia.

The commission also learned that some foreign military experts regard EMP attack as a form of electronic or information warfare, not primarily as a form of nuclear war. One of China's leading military theorists has written:

Information war and traditional war have one thing in common, namely that the country which possesses the critical weapons such as atomic bombs will have "first strike" and "second strike retaliation" capabilities . . . .

As soon as its computer networks come under attack and are destroyed, the country will slip into a state of paralysis and the lives of its people will grind to a halt. (Su Tzu Yun, World War: The Third World War — Total Information Warfare, 2001.)

In Iran — the most unabashed state sponsor of international terrorism today — some theorists have argued that the key to defeating the United States lies in attacking its electronics. This is from an Iranian political military policy journal:

Once you confuse the enemy communication network, you can also disrupt the work of the enemy command and decision making center.

Even worse, today when you disable a country's military high command through disruption of communications you will, in effect, disrupt all the affairs of that country. . . . If the world's industrial countries fail to devise effective ways to defend themselves against dangerous electronic assaults, then they will disintegrate within a few years. . . . American soldiers would not be able to find food to eat nor would they be able to fire a single shot. ("Electronics to Determine Fate of Future Wars," Nashriyeh e Siasi Nezami, 1999.)

And this implied threat may not be empty words. In addition to their successful ship launched Scud missile test, the Iranian military has reportedly performed tests of its Shahab 3 medium range ballistic missile in a manner consistent with an EMP attack scenario.

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The above excerpt is from Chapter Six, "Counter the Mega-Threat: EMP Attack" of the book "War Footing " by Frank J. Gaffney (Naval Institute Press) and included contributions from U.S. Rep. Curt Weldon and U.S. Rep. Roscoe Bartlett.

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"Believe nothing, no matter where you read it, or who said it, no matter if I have said it, unless it agrees with your own reason and your own common sense." - Buddha

Posted by ENEMY OF THE STATE at 5:08 AM - No Comments   Add a Comment  
 
 Space Weapons and the Risk of Accidental Nuclear War
 



http://lnk.nu/armscontrol.org/6t7.asp

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Space Weapons and the Risk of Accidental Nuclear War

Thomas Graham, Jr.

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The United States and Russia maintain thousands of nuclear warheads on long-range ballistic missiles on 15-minute alert. Once launched, they cannot be recalled, and they will strike their targets in roughly 30 minutes. Fifteen years after the end of the Cold War, the chance of an accidental nuclear exchange has far from decreased. Yet, the United States may be contemplating further exacerbating this threat by deploying missile interceptors in space.

Both the United States and Russia rely on space-based systems to provide early warning of a nuclear attack. If deployed, however, U.S. space-based missile defense interceptors could eliminate the Russian early warning satellites quickly and without warning. So, just the existence of U.S. space weapons could make Russia’s strategic trigger fingers itchy.

The potential protection space-based defenses might offer the United States is swamped therefore by their potential cost: a failure of or false signal from a component of the Russian early warning system could lead to a disastrous reaction and accidental nuclear war. There is no conceivable missile defense, space-based or not, that would offer protection in the event that the Russian nuclear arsenal was launched at the United States.

Nor are the Russians or other countries likely to stand still and watch the United States construct space-based defenses. These states are likely to respond by developing advanced anti-satellite weapon systems.[1] These weapons, in turn, would endanger U.S. early warning systems, impair valuable U.S. weapons intelligence efforts, and increase the jitteriness of U.S. officials.

The Dangers of Failed Early Warning Systems

The Russian early warning system is in serious disrepair. This system consists of older radar systems nearing the end of their operational life and just three functioning satellites, although the Russian military has plans to deploy more. The United States has 15 such satellites. Ten years ago, on January 25, 1995, this aging early warning network picked up a rocket launch from Norway. The Russian military could not determine the nature of the missile or its destination. Fearing that it might be a submarine-launched missile aimed at Moscow with the purpose of decapitating the Russian command and control structure, the Russian military alerted President Boris Yeltsin, his defense minister, and the chief of the general staff. They immediately opened an emergency teleconference to determine whether they needed to order Russia’s strategic forces to launch a counterattack.

The rocket that had been launched was actually an atmospheric sounding rocket conducting scientific observations of the aurora borealis. Norway had notified Russia of this launch several weeks earlier, but the message had not reached the relevant sections of the military. In little more than two minutes before the deadline to order nuclear retaliation, the Russians realized their mistake and stood down their strategic forces.

Thus, 10 years ago, when the declining Russian early warning system was stronger than today, it read this single small missile test launch as a U.S. nuclear missile attack on Russia. The alarm went up the Russian chain of command all the way to the top. The briefcase containing the nuclear missile launch codes was brought to Yeltsin as he was told of the attack. Fortunately, Yeltsin and the Russian leadership made the correct decision that day and directed the Russian strategic nuclear forces to stand down.

Obviously, nothing should be done in any way further to diminish the reliability of the space-based components of U.S. and Russian ballistic missile early warning systems. A decline in confidence in such early warning systems caused by the deployment of weapons in space would enhance the risk of an accidental nuclear weapons attack. Yet, as part of its plans for missile defense, the Pentagon is calling for the development of a test bed for space-based interceptors as well as examining a number of other exotic space weapons. In an interview published in Arms Control Today, Lt. Gen. Henry Obering, director of the Missile Defense Agency, touted what he said was “a very modest and moderate test-bed approach to launch some experiments.” Obering said the Pentagon would only deploy a handful of interceptors: “We are talking about onesies, twosies in terms of experimentation.”[2]

Despite Obering’s claims, however, establishing a test bed for missile defense in space, as opposed to current preliminary research, would be a long step toward space weaponization. Once space-based missile defenses are tested, they are likely to be deployed, and in significant numbers, no matter if the tests are successful.

To see the path that a space test bed is likely to follow, one need only look at the present ground-based program: the Pentagon claims there is little true difference between a test bed and an operational deployment. Moreover, in space the deployment could be more dramatic. Although the current ground-based configuration envisions a few dozen interceptors, continuous space coverage over a few countries of concern would likely require a very large number of interceptors because a particular interceptor will be above a particular target for only a few minutes a day. Today’s missile defenses provide very little real protection as the United States currently faces no realistic threat of deliberate attack by nuclear-armed long-range missiles. But space weapons could actually be detrimental to U.S. national security. They would increase the perceived vulnerability of early warning systems to attack and cause Russia and perhaps other countries such as China to pursue potentially destabilizing countermeasures, such as advanced anti-satellite weapons.

These dangers would be particularly worrisome for those components that are placed in geosynchronous orbits (GEO). Space objects in GEO are sufficiently far from the Earth (about 36,000 kilometers) so that their speed roughly matches the rotational speed of the Earth and they remain “stationary” above one location. To be sure, any country that can place a satellite in these farther orbits—and there are several—could potentially threaten another country’s satellites there. Yet, it would be easier to do so, and perhaps more importantly, the threat perception would be greater with weapons based in space than with existing ground-based technology. The 15 U.S. early warning satellites are almost entirely in GEO. The three functioning Russian early warning satellites utilize two different orbits. Two of the satellites use a highly elliptical orbit, which ranges from low-Earth orbit (LEO)—100 to 2,000 kilometers above the Earth where space objects travel at about 8 kilometers per second—out to GEO. The other satellite is permanently stationed in GEO.

Moreover, a space arms competition could hinder the flow of satellite imagery that can be used to track activities that might reveal programs to develop weapons of mass destruction in countries of concern. For example, activities detected through space-based collection systems can be used to trigger requests for inspections pursuant to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) (implicitly) or the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (explicitly), should that treaty be brought into force. It is important in this respect to recall that the suspicions that Israel and South Africa may have conducted an atmospheric nuclear test in 1979 were driven by readout from a U.S. VELA satellite.

Similarly, the United States has benefited from the revolution in national intelligence that began with and is based on photographic reconnaissance satellites and related systems, which has helped bring to an end the worst-case analysis and close calls with nuclear war that existed throughout the Cold War. If a truly peaceful and stable world order is ever achieved, the advent of this technology beginning in the late 1950s will be regarded by future generations as a major historical turning point.

These are crucial efforts that must never be allowed to be disrupted, either by space-based weapons or with the relatively simplistic ground-based anti-satellite weapon systems that could today be deployed. The United States has considerable anti-satellite weapons capability. An F-15-based homing vehicle system was successfully tested in the 1980s, and the anti-ballistic missile system currently being deployed in Alaska and California has an inherent anti-satellite capability. Right now, no other country is developing a counterspace system, although the Soviet Union successfully tested a co-orbital anti-satellite system in the 1970s and 1980s and Russia and China are believed to be capable of doing so. Notably, 28 countries have ballistic missiles that can reach LEO satellites, and all have the technical capability to develop a LEO anti-satellite system by modifying these missiles.

Active defenses—the deployment of devices intended to deflect, destroy, or render unworkable offensive systems—cannot by themselves be expected to provide adequate protection of space assets either now or in the long term. These technologies, as well as hardening and other passive means of defense, may provide some means of defending against the current generation of anti-satellite technology. Eventually, however, our would-be attackers would find ways to counter those defenses. Thus, it would appear that an agreed legal regime, predicated on mutually beneficial and, of course, verifiable restraint, should at least be considered.

Protecting Early Warning Systems

Rather than building space weapons, it may be best to put space off-limits for arms. Domestic law in major spacefaring countries around the world could prohibit programs for developing space-based weapons. To reinforce this effort, there could be a worldwide understanding that placing weapons in space or further developing existing anti-satellite weapons capability is contrary to international law and thereby a basis for economic and political pressure and punitive sanctions by a united world community. The best way to accomplish these twin objectives is by the development and negotiation of an international treaty on space weapons and anti-satellite weapons. Treaties become domestic law when ratified, and they can establish worldwide norms of behavior.

The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 is included in a unique class of arms control agreements sometimes referred to as nonarmament treaties. These agreements were intended to prevent and have been successful in preventing the deployment of weapons in areas where they have not previously been present. Today, after more than three decades, space remains free of weapons of mass destruction thanks to the Outer Space Treaty. Pursuant to the initiative of President Dwight Eisenhower, who at the time of his establishment of NASA made it clear that it was U.S. policy to keep space weapons-free, space remains free of weapons of all kinds. Space has long been militarized—early warning systems are military systems—but it has never been weaponized. This policy has served us well for decades, and there is a strong burden of persuasion on any who argue that it should be changed.

It was asserted during the administrations of George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton that there was no need for limitations beyond the existing Outer Space Treaty as no arms race or threat of an arms race in space existed. The Eisenhower policy held in the United States and was supported everywhere else. Consistent with the Bush-Clinton position, over the years, the United States routinely opposed the creation of a negotiating mandate for outer space at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. A number of years ago, a more formal effort began in Geneva and New York called Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). The United States did not support this, abstaining from voting on the resolution in the UN General Assembly each year. And this year it voted no. Moreover, the standard argument for continuance of the Bush-Clinton position is no longer valid in the wake of the January 2001 report of the Rumsfeld space commission, which declared that a serious risk existed of a “ Pearl Harbor in space.”

It has been suggested that a legal regime to prevent the weaponization of space could be crafted simply by expanding or building on the Outer Space Treaty. There may be some merit to this notion, especially considering that the treaty has more than 90 states-parties. However, the subject is complicated, and there are many important interests to protect in addition to space assets for early warning and for intelligence and verification such as remote sensing, telecommunications, navigation, and the enhancement of ground-based military capabilities.

An expanded Outer Space Treaty could include first and foremost a prohibition on all weapons in space, both offensive and defensive, as they are not distinguishable. “Weapon” would have to be defined for the purposes of this treaty so as to exclude space objects with a peaceful purpose and items that are not relevant to the objective of preventing space weaponization. Also, space objects designed to support terrestrial military operations such as the Global Positioning System maintained by the U.S. Air Force should be explicitly permitted. Some kind of inspection of payloads of space launches would be necessary, perhaps modified by the principle of “managed access” as found in the CWC. Provisions on transparency of space activities and on information sharing would be required. These amendatory provisions could be negotiated in a separate stand-alone protocol to reduce somewhat the risk of reopening other provisions of the Outer Space Treaty.

Some have argued that it is premature to consider additional legal obligations in space, that informal “rules of the road” would get far more support. Others argue that the United States must resist the call for any new international legal obligations inhibiting the deployment of weapons in space. It is asserted that any such agreement or arrangement would be unenforceable and unverifiable and that “the ignominious record of enforcing and verifying treaties prohibiting activities on Earth is proof enough to give pause to any conversation about a treaty governing activities in space.”[3]

Yet, where would we be without the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty? Likely, more than 40 states would be armed with nuclear weapons, meaning that every conflict would run the risk of going nuclear, and nuclear weapons would be so widespread it would be impossible to keep them out of the hands of terrorist organizations. Where would we be without the strategic arms limitation and reduction agreements of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s? Likely, the United States and Russia would have so many nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, they could never be controlled. Where would we be without the Outer Space Treaty? Nuclear weapons could be orbiting the Earth with the capability to strike anywhere, anytime without warning. Where are we now in the wake of the dissolution of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty? We possibly could be on the verge of actively considering the development and deployment of space-based ABM systems that would address no current or foreseeable threat but could unhinge strategic stability.

The history of the last 50 years teaches us that, if dangerous weapons and technologies are to be controlled to the safety and security of all, it must be done early, before the programs become entrenched. That time may well be now with respect to weapons in space. The United States does not have a secure future in space without broad and sustained international cooperation. The deployment of weapons in space, whether offensive or defensive, would make this necessary cooperation difficult if not impossible. There would likely be retaliation, which would seriously degrade the progress that has been made over the last five or six decades toward multilateral international cooperation in space.

The groundwork for a comprehensive treaty-based regime has been laid, and the importance of this objective is clear. Much work remains, but the creation of a space regime, under which the international community decisively enshrines space as a peaceful environment, ultimately is the only thoroughgoing alternative to a weaponized space free-for-all. The United States and the rest of the world risk being rendered forever vulnerable to the vagaries and fluctuations of technology development. In this age of a worldwide struggle against international terrorism, this is the last thing we should want.

Preventing the weaponization of space is of paramount importance to world stability. Any deployment of weapons of a significant nature in space, particularly highly capable weapons systems such as a space-based missile defense, could provoke countermeasures. There are many important assets in space, and it is highly likely that they will only continue to flourish in the current sanctuary environment in place since the days of Eisenhower. Above all, we should never take the slightest chance of impairing early warning systems on which the long nuclear peace between the United States and Russia may continue to depend.

-

Thomas Graham, Jr. is a former special representative of the president for arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament. In this and other senior capacities, he participated in every major arms control and nonproliferation negotiation in which the United States took part from 1970 to 1997. Graham is the author of Disarmament Sketches (2002), Cornerstones of Security with Damien LaVera (2003), and Common Sense on Weapons of Mass Destruction (2004).

ENDNOTES

1. Michael Krepon, “Space Weapons and Proliferation,” Nonproliferation Review, September 2005.

2. “Defending Missile Defense: An Interview With Missile Defense Agency Director Lt. Gen. Henry Obering,” Arms Control Today, November 2005, pp. 6-11.

3. Jeff Kueter and Andrew Plieninger, “Saving Space: Securing Our Space Assets,” Marshall Institute Policy Outlook, July 2005.

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